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THE CHALLENGE OF TEACHING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Mark Seidenfeld*
In this short essay, I explain why I find Administrative Law so challenging
to teach, describe several approaches I have tried to meet this challenge, and
report on the failures and partial successes of the various approaches.
I think that Administrative Law is such a challenging course for two
reasons: (i) the vast majority of my students do not have any experience or
intuitions about how agencies make decisions; and (ii) the subject of
administrative law does not lend itself to coherent step-by-step development
because every topic dovetails with virtually every other topic, so thatno matter
where one starts, one must refer to material that has not yet been covered.
Cross referencing at a general level would not be a problem if students had
some idea aboutthe cross referenced issue, but being neophytes about agency
decision making means that they do not have such an idea, and are often left
bewildered and confused.
I have tried what I will label two "pure" organizational approaches to
teaching Administrative Law, and my current approach, which is a hybrid of
the two. The first pure approach-the theoretical underpinnings approachbegins by developing a theory (or perhaps competing theories) of
administrative agencies. This is the approach ofmany standard texts.I These
texts talk first about how agencies are created, then move to agencies'
relationships with the political branches-the President and Congressstressing that these relationships often depend on constitutional principles
governing how these branches interact with each other. This approach next
addresses the relationship of the agencies and the courts, with heavy emphasis
on judicial review. Finally, this approach discusses the law governing the
procedures agencies use to make decisions, focusing emphasis on how
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agencies differ from courts and legislatures.
The advantage of this approach is its abstract coherence; it builds a logical
(if controversial) structure of the administrative state. Students learn about the
sources of authority for agency decision making. They then learn about
political constraints on agencies, which to some extent flow from principles
aboutthe sources of administrative authority. When the students gettojudicial
review, if they have absorbed the material from the first two topics, they can
be lead to understand that the courts are not the only or even the major
constraint on agency decision making. Finally, armed with a secure
understanding of agencies' place in government, students are supposed to be
able to appreciate the procedures that the law dictates agencies follow.
In my experience, following this approach did not achieve the coherence
it promised. Students were often baffled and even more frequently bored by
theories of the administrative state. They moaned when they had to reread
separation of powers cases they read for Constitutional Law. Without any
appreciation for either the substance or procedure of agency regulation,
students did not see the relevance of the theoretical materials and simply
glossed over them. That, of course, is a major impediment to an approach
premised on the students learning theories of the administrative state as a
means of providing a coherent framework for the course.
The second pure approach-the procedural approach-worked somewhat
better, but still had its problems. Underthis approach, I proceeded through the
various procedural requirements imposed on agencies by the Due Process
2
Clause of the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). I
then covered assorted sundry procedural questions, such as exceptions from
procedural paradigms, courts' authority to prescribe procedures not required
by statute or regulation, and agencies' discretion to choose the procedural
mode by which they announce and to some extent effectuate policy. I
followed coverage of procedure with the study of judicial review. The
component onjudicial review became the major focus of the course because,
as lawyers, students primarily will be asserting arguments in agency and
judicial proceedings that stem from constraints placed on agencies by the
courts.
The procedural approach kept the students' attention somewhat better
than the theoretical underpinnings approach. Students could seethe relevance

2 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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of the law governing procedures and judicial review to the kinds of questions
they might face were they to practice administrative law. But students were
not able to appreciate much of the academic criticism of the law because they
did not have any sense of why the procedures were imposed-that is, why the
procedures mattered in the big picture of how government ought to be
structured. Arguments premised on maintaining accountability or limiting nonmajoritarianjudicial interference with implementation ofthe political branches'
judgments echoed hollowly inthe heads of students who had no understanding
of the relationship of agencies to the political branches and the courts.
In addition, the procedural approach has the drawback of requiring
discussion of procedural constraints whose justification depends on other
procedural aspects of administrative law. For example, it is difficult to
evaluate the wisdom of allowing agencies to issue interpretive rules as an
exception to notice and comment rulemaking without understanding: (i) the
freedom agencies have to impose interpretations within an adjudication,3 and
(ii) the discretion given to agencies by the courts on matters of interpretation.I
The validity of allowing agencies freedom to choose the mode by which they
announce interpretations, and the deference given to their interpretations, in
turn, depends on how effectively Congress can monitor agency decision
making of various types. For example, can Congress monitor particular
adjudicatory decisions (which raises theoretical issues about police patrols
versus fire alarms as the mechanism for congressional monitoring)?'
Unfortunately, by following this approach I leave until later (and in some years
never get to) the material on presidential and congressional influence over
decision making, which is essential to evaluation of the procedural
controversies.
The approach I currently use for teaching Administrative Law involves
what I call a hybrid approach based on successive iterations of the theoretical
and procedural materials, covering that material with greater and greater

See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Corp., 416 U.S.
267, 268-69 (1974).
4 See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
1 See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
AdministrativeArrangementsand thePoliticalControlofAgencies, 75 VA.L.REv. 431 (1989);
Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus FireAlarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
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particularity with each pass. Using this hybrid approach, I begin with an
overview of the place of agencies in government. I start by describing the
kinds of programs that agencies implement. I proceed to discuss several
proffered theoretical justifications for the administrative state (i.e.
formalist/transmission belt theory, expertise theory, legal process theory, and
pluralistic/interest group theory (both the optimistic models of David Truman
and Robert Dahl and the pessimistic models of George Stigler, Richard Posner,
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock)).6 In order not to lose students'
attention, I inform them that although no theory enjoys hegemony in the sense
ofjustifying all of administrative law doctrine, many (if not all) of the doctrines
of administrative law can be seen as effectuating one ofthe theories I present.
I pitch the theory as practical in aiding practitioners to develop arguments in
support or opposition to particular rules of administrative law. I then hold my
breath and hope that I can maintain students' interest for a week, after which
I turn to more accessible (i.e. less theoretical) subjects.
After a week of theory and background, I spend some time discussing the
structure of agencies and the internal/institutional procedures by which
agencies make decisions. In other words, I discuss materials that many
courses on administrative law consider inside of a black box, and which, if
pressed, most teachers of Administrative Law categorize as falling within the
province of public administration, rather than law. The discussion of agency
structure is meantto provide a segue from theory to practice that is sufficiently
accessible to reinforce my efforts of the first two weeks to keep students
interested in theory. I have found that this discussion works to tie theory to
practice for about half my students; the other half, I am afraid, consider any
discussion of theory to be irrelevant.
. I begin my foray into procedure by discussing the paradigmatic modes of
decision making-rulemaking and adjudication. By the beginning of the third
week of class, I give what is probably the single most important lecture for
holding the class together-an overview of the procedural categories in the
6

See JAMEs M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); ROBERT A. DAHL,
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967);

DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 512-516 (1951); Richard A. Posner,
Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971); George Stigler, The
Theory ofEconomicRegulation, 2 BELLJ. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). For an overview
of these potential theories as justifications for the administrative state, see Mark Seidenfeld, A
Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV.L. REV. 1511, 1516-28,
1541-62 (1992).
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APA. I do this by going through a hypothetical on regulation under a fictitious
"Wetlands Preservation Act." (I have attached the hypothetical as an
appendix to this essay.) The hypothetical introduces the students to the
definition section of the APA,7 with particular attention to the definitions of

rulemaking, adjudication and licensing. Students get very involved in the
exercise of going through the hypothetical. The hypothetical is structured not
only to take the students through the EPA's categories, but also to illustrate the
discretion agencies have to create programs, like those that require a permit,
as a means of implementing the Act. I have also structured the hypothetical
to allow me to give the students "coming attractions" forthe rest ofthe course.
Following this overview of the APA, I go through the cases that discuss
the details of administrative procedure. But, in so doing, I am ever vigilant to
point out to students how the theoretical understandings we have already
discussed inform the debate about appropriate agency procedures. For
example, one can inform discussion of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC8 and Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp. v. LT, Corp.' by

evaluating those decisions fromthe perspective of various theoretical models
of the administrative state. If the agency is justified on expertise grounds,
there would seem to be little role for the courts to add to agency procedures;
if the agency is justified by an interest group model, the courts may have a role
in assuring open access to agency procedures; if one adopts the legal process
model, which distinguishes policy making by agencies from law-applying, then
one might argue in favor of Vermont Yankee's proscription of judicial
interference with rulemaking procedures, but condemnLTV's holdingthatthe
same principle applies in the adjudicatory context.
In addition, I include in the materials on formal adjudication, the Morgan
cases, 10 which address internal agency decision making processes. These
cases reinforce my earlier coverage of agency organization and emphasize the
institutional nature of agencies, as distinguished from the more individual
decision making of judges. Morgan IVis also a good introduction to legal

7 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
8 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
10

496 U.S. 633 (1990).
See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (Morgan I); Morgan v. United States,

304 U.S. I (1938) (Morgan l); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939) (Morgan llI);
United States v.Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Morgan IV).
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fictions meant to deal with the problems of attributing intent to an institution,
which become important when one discusses thejudicially imposed standard
of "reasoned decision making" as part of arbitrary and capricious review."
Following my foray into agency procedures, I turn back to the reasons we
have agencies in the first place, reviewing how they are created and the role
they play. This time through this abstract material, however, I use the
separation of powers cases to bring theoretical considerations to bear on the
relationship of administrative agencies to the political branches ofgovernment.
My students now have some idea of what agencies do and how they go about
doing it, and are more comfortable considering political constraints on agencies
and the likely efficacy of such constraints. Some students have told me that
placing the discussion of agency oversight by the three branches of
government behind the discussion of decision making procedures (without
jettisoning it completely) makes the topic more interesting to them. And,
reviewing political constraints on agencies and asking whether they provide
meaningful checks on agency decision making introduces the students to the
possibility thatthe political branches, rather than the courts, might be the better
institutions to cabin agency power.
Finally, armed with both theoretical underpinnings and some familiarity
with the workings of the administrative state, students tackle the issues raised
by judicial review. Under the hybrid approach, they can better appreciate the
interplay between the branches of government that informs cases like
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC12 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 3 They also
can appreciate the concerns of critics such as Tom McGarity that judicial
review threatens to ossify the rulemaking process. 4
Does the hybrid approach meet all the challenges of teaching
Administrative Law? Emphatically no! Students still find the course difficult
because the material is foreign and the theories difficult to comprehend.
Perhaps most significantly, the approach leaves until last what many consider
to be the guts of Administrative Law-judicial review. Pragmatically, this
forces me to hurry my coverage of judicial review, which may undo all the
" See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(quoting SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
12 467 U. S. 837 (1984).
13 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
14 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossing" the Rulemaking Process,

41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-96 (1992).
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benefits of setting the stage for this topic in the first place. For my better
students, however, the approach of introducing theory and procedure in
increasing levels of specificity, rather than first presenting one or the other in
toto, gives them the tools they need to go beyond merely learning the doctrinal
rules of administrative law. I have found that the hybrid approach engages
these students to a greater degree than either pure approach. On occasion,
these students surprise me with how much they can learn in one three-hour
course about an area of law that is so complex and non-intuitive.
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APPENDIX
HYPOTHETICAL ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE APA
Congress passes the "Wetlands Preservation Act" which states as its purpose
ensuring the "viability of significant wetland area as healthy ecosystems." The
statute authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to "adopt such
regulations governing use of and incidental effects on wetlands as will promote
the purposes of this Act, taking into consideration the costs of compliance with
such regulations and the public interest." The Act further provides that if,
after a hearing, the EPA determines, based on evidence in the hearing record,
that a person has violated any provisions ofthis Act, or any regulation adopted
pursuant to this Act, the EPA may order that person to restore the affected
wetlands to the extent feasible, and fine that person up to $100,000 per
violation.
A. The EPA staff proposes a rule that before any person engages in
construction, or digs a well, or otherwise uses earth boring or earth moving
equipment within 500 feet of a wetland exceeding one acre, that person must
obtain a permit from the EPA.
1.What procedures mustthe EPA follow (i.e. what steps must ittake) in order
to adopt this rule?
2. If the statute provided that the EPA must give all parties an opportunity to
respond to comments filed by other parties or the agency staff, how (if at all)
would this alter the procedures the agency must follow?
B. Suppose instead that the statute had said the EPA could adopt rules, but
only after holding a hearing, and any rule adopted must be supported by
evidence in the hearing record. What procedures would the agency then have
to follow in order to adopt the rule?
C. Suppose now the agency does adopt the rule, and the EPA staff learns that
after the rule took effect Joe Builder built a house within 500 feet of an
existing wetland over one acre in size. The EPA wants to hold a proceeding
to determine whether to fine Joe Builder.
1. What procedures must it follow before it fines Joe?
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2. If the statute had authorized the EPA to fine violators, but had not said it
must first hold a hearing and make a determination based on the hearing
record, what procedures would the EPA have to follow?

D. Suppose that Josephine Landowner plans to build a house less than 500
feet from a wetland that is over one acre. She would like a permit from the
EPA. The EPA has procedural rules that require permit applicants to
complete a standard questionnaire. The EPA staff then reviews the
applicant's questionnaire, and ifit spots issues that may result in a denial of the
permit, the staff informs the applicant in writing and asks her to submit in
writing any information and arguments that respond to the staff s concern.
The staff then prepares an analysis for the EPA Administrator, who decides
whether to issue the permit based onthe initial questionnaire, the staff analysis,
and the information and arguments the applicant has submitted in support of
her application.
1. Is this procedure for issuing permits sufficient under the APA?
E. Suppose that Earnest Environmentalist would like the EPA to adopt a
stricter rule protecting wetlands, and he drafts such a rule.
1. How can he try to get the EPA to adopt his rule?
2. If the EPA does not want to adopt Earnest's proposed rule, what must it
do? (For example, does it need to go through a rulemaking proceeding to
consider the proposed rule? Ifnot, what procedures must it go through before
deciding not initiate a rulemaking procedure?)

F. In all of the situations (A through D) above, what recourse does a party
have if she does not like the EPA determination?

